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Medhåtithi's commentary on Manu 1.5 cites the following proverb (janapravåda) (Jha, 
1920-1939: I: 8 l. 7): åmrån p®∑†a˙ kovidårån åca∑†e. Wezler (1999: 139) translates: "Being 
questioned about mangoes he acquaints [one] with the kovidåra (trees)", and oberves in a 
note (p. 151 n. 9): "Note that this proverb does not belong to those dealt with by Hopkins 
1887 and Pischel 1893." It is however mentioned in the Nyåyokti-koßa of Chhabinath 
Mishra (1978: 22, s.v. åmrån p®∑†a˙ ...), where it is pointed out that the proverb occurs in 
the Mahåbhå∑ya (Mahå-bh I p. 219 l. 16, on P. 1.2.45 vt. 8). 
 However, a closely similar expression occurs in the early Buddhist Íråmaˆyaphala 
SËtra. The different versions of this text can be most easily cited from Meisig's Das 
Íråmaˆyaphala-SËtra (1987). We find the proverb in Sanskrit in the Sa∫ghabhedavastu: tad 
yathå bhadanta/puru∑a˙ åmråˆi p®∑†a˙ lakucåni vyåkuryåt, lakucåni vå p®∑†a˙ åmråˆi 
vyåkuryåt, evam .... , in Påli in the D¥gha Nikåya: seyyathåpi bhante ambaµ vå pu††ho 
labujaµ vyåkareya, labujaµ vå pu††ho ambaµ vyåkareyya, evam ... (Meisig, 1987: 130, 
140, 148, 156, 162, (168)). The Chinese parallels translated by Meisig confirm that the 
translators used a similar text, even though the precise nature of the fruits mentioned may 
not have been preserved in translation. 
 In spite of the differences of detail, it is clear that Patañjali here uses essentially the 
same expression as certain Buddhist texts. This is interesting, for it suggests that Patañjali 
the author of the Mahåbhå∑ya may have been influenced by Buddhist texts, and may 
therefore conceivably have undergone Buddhist influence. Influence in the opposite 
direction, from Patañjali to the Buddhist texts concerned, seems excluded, since the 
Íråmaˆyaphala SËtra is a canonical text, which we may assume to be older than Patañjali, if 
not exactly in its surviving form than at least in some earlier form. Given that our proverb 
occurs in all the different versions of the SËtra, it seems safe to conclude that this earlier 
form already contained the proverb under consideration. 
 It goes without saying that the occurrence of a similar proverb both in a Buddhist 
canonical text and in the Mahåbhå∑ya does not, by itself, prove that Patañjali has here been 
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influenced by that particular Buddhist text, or by Buddhists in general. It is conceivable that 
this proverb was in use in Patañjali's circles, as it was in use in the circles of those who 
composed (or redacted) the Íråmaˆyaphala SËtra. However, this is not the only example of 
striking similarity between Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya and certain Buddhist texts. 
 Patañjali speaks at one occasion about “sciences which have something auspicious 
in the beginning, in the middle and in the end” (ma∫galåd¥ni ma∫galamadhyåni 
ma∫galåntåni ßåstråˆi; Mahå-bh I p. 253 l. 5-6, on P. 1.3.1 vt. 1a). He uses this expression 
in connection with Påˆini's A∑†ådhyåy¥, but a closer inspection shows that it does not very 
well fit this text. The A∑†ådhyåy¥ has, to be sure, “something auspicious" in the beginning: 
P. 1.1.1 (v®ddhir åd aic) begins with the word v®ddhi, which is auspicious. But this text does 
not have something auspicious in the middle; or rather, the presence of bhË in P. 1.3.1 
which Patañjali mentions in this connection does not occur in the middle at all: it occurs at 
the beginning of the third Påda of a text which altogether has thirty-two of them. The 
“something auspicious” at the end remains unspecified in the Mahåbhå∑ya. Some 
commentators propose the use of udaya in P. 8.4.67, which is not the very end of the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥. 
 It appears that Patañjali got the notion of “sciences which have something 
auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and in the end” from elsewhere. Once again it is 
not very difficult to identify a possible source. A number of early Buddhist texts speak of 
the Dharma taught by the Buddha as being “auspicious in the beginning, in the middle and 
in the end”. The Påli expression is: ådikalyåˆa, majjhekalyåˆa, pariyosånakalyåˆa; the 
terms used in Sanskrit are: ådau kalyåˆa, madhye kalyåˆa, paryavasåne kalyåˆa. The Påli 
expression is frequent, especially in the Vinaya and Sutta Pi†akas (cf. PTC s.v. ådikalyåˆa); 
the Sanskrit expression has been preserved in the Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra, the Daßottara 
SËtra, the Nidånasaµyukta, and elsewhere (cf. SWTF s.v. ådi). 
 For a third parallel consider the following passage from the Mahåbhå∑ya (Mahå-bh 
II p. 120 l. 20-21): 
 
athavå bhavati vai kaßcij jågrad api vartamånakålaµ nopalabhate/ tad yathå/ 
vaiyåkaraˆånåµ ßåka†åyano rathamårga ås¥na˙ ßaka†asårthaµ yåntaµ nopalebhe/ 
“Alternatively, there are people who, though awake, do not perceive the present. For 
example: Íåka†åyana from among the grammarians, while sitting at [the side of] the 
carriage-road, did not perceive a group of carts that passed by.” 
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A variant of this account occurs in the Buddhist Mahåparinirvåˆa SËtra and its parallels. 
Here the story is of course not told about the grammarian Íåka†åyana, but about someone 
called Órå∂a Kålåma. The Sanskrit version reads (MPS 28.18): 
 
saµjñ¥ evåhaµ ... samåno jågran nåßrau∑aµ pañcånåµ ßaka†aßatånåµ 
vyatikramamåˆånåµ ßabdam 
“Even though conscious and awake I did not hear the sound of five hundred carts 
passing by.” 
 
In this particular case Patañjali's story about a grammarian who did not hear a deafening 
noise sounds rather improbable. Let us not forget that early Indian literature shows little 
interest for or acquaintance with absent-minded professors. The story fits much better in an 
originally ascetic context, where practitioners were deeply concerned with suppressing the 
activities of the senses. Here too, the Buddhist milieu may be the source from which 
Patañjali drew this story. Once again, however, it must be admitted that without further 
evidence it may be difficult to prove this with certainty. 
 Consider now the following two expressions used by Patañjali: guˆasaµdråvo 
dravyam (Mahå-bh II p. 366 l. 26, on P. 5.1.119 vt. 5) and guˆasamudåyo dravyam (Mahå-
bh II p. 200 l. 13-14), to which attention has been drawn by Albrecht Wezler (1985). Both 
state that material objects are collections of qualities; the context makes clear that the 
qualities concerned are sound (ßabda), touch (sparßa), colour (rËpa), taste (rasa) and smell 
(gandha). There is no reason to believe that Patañjali himself accepted this position, yet its 
very mention proves that there were thinkers at the time of Patañjali who did. Who were 
they? 
 It is known that the Såµkhya philosophy accepted the position that material objects 
are collections of qualities during a part of its history (Bronkhorst, 1994). There is however 
no reason to think that Såµkhya as a developed philosophy existed already at the time of 
Patañjali. His Mahåbhå∑ya, at any rate, contains no clear indication that he was acquainted 
with this school of thought. But Såµkhya was not the only philosophy that accepted this 
position. Buddhist Sarvåstivåda accepted it well before Såµkhya (see, e.g., Bronkhorst, 
2000: 113-114). Patañjali's remarks are most easily explained by the assumption that he 
was, whether directly or indirectly, acquainted with Sarvåstivåda Buddhism. 
 Patañjali's last considered remarks have taken us out of the domain of literary 
themes into that of philosophical ideas. They suggest that Patañjali may have undergone 
Buddhist influence (perhaps indirectly) in both these domains. This raises the question 
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whether further Buddhist-like features of a philosophical nature can be found in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya. 
 This is indeed the case. The Mahåbhå∑ya does not contain many philosophical ideas, 
but some of them are noteworthy. Particularly important are Patañjali's ideas about the 
nature of words and sounds. Nothing in the grammatical discussions dealt with requires him 
to take a position in this matter, yet he does.  
 Patañjali distinguishes the individual speech sound as an entity, which he sometimes 
calls spho†a, from the noise (dhvani) that expresses it. The spho†a, as he puts it, is the sound 
itself, whereas the dhvani is a quality of the sound (Mahå-bh I p. 181 l. 19-20, on P. 1.1.70 
vt. 5: evaµ tarhi spho†a˙ ßabdo dhvani˙ ßabdaguˆa˙). Elsewhere it becomes clear that he 
considers words and their speech sounds eternal and unchanging. He does, for example, call 
the speech sounds fixed (Mahå-bh I p. 181 l. 14, on P. 1.1.70 vt. 5: avasthitå varˆå[˙]). The 
following passage is particularly clear (Mahå-bh I p. 18 l. 14-15, on ÍivasËtra 1 vt. 12): 
 
nityåß ca ßabdå˙/ nitye∑u ca ßabde∑u kË†asthair avicålibhir varˆair bhavitavyam 
anapåyopajanavikåribhi˙/ 
“And words are eternal. And the speech sounds in the eternal words must be 
permanent, unchanging, free from diminution, augmentation and modification.” 
 
This last passage suggests that also words, and not only their constituent sounds, are 
eternal. Patañjali's discussion of the first part of what is presented in Kielhorn's edition as 
the very first vårttika of the Mahåbhå∑ya (siddhe ßabdårthasaµbandhe; there are reasons to 
think that this is not the first vårttika, see Bronkhorst 1987a) confirms this in a long 
discussion. It is hard to think that a mere collection of speech sounds can be eternal. 
 It is clear from other passages that Patañjali considers words to be more than just 
collections of speech sounds. Indeed, he postulates the word as being one single entity 
(Mahå-bh I p. 31 l. 10, on ÍivasËtra 5 vt. 13: saµghåtasyaikatvam). This is all the more 
noteworthy in view of the fact that Patañjali emphatically states that the sounds of words do 
not occur simultaneously (Mahå-bh I p. 356 l. 5-8, on P. 1.4.109 vt. 10):  
 
gaur iti yåvad gakåre våg vartate naukåre na visarjan¥ye/ yåvad aukåre na gakåre na 
visarjan¥ye/ yåvad visarjan¥ye na gakåre naukåre/ uccaritapradhvaµsitvåt/ 
uccaritapradhvaµsina˙ khalv api varˆå˙/ 
“In the case of gau˙, as long as speech is concerned with the sound g, [it is] not 
[concerned] with the sounds au and ˙. As long as [it is concerned] with au, [it is] not 
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[concerned] with g and ˙. As long as [it is concerned] with ˙, [it is] not [concerned] 
with g and au. Because they disappear as soon as they are pronounced. Sounds 
indeed disappear as soon as they have been pronounced.” 
 
Patañjali is not particularly prolix about the nature of words, but a relatively clear picture is 
obtained by piecing together various remarks which he makes in different contexts. It 
seems clear, for example, that the single entity which is the word according to Patañjali, has 
an objective existence, not a merely mental one. The word, as he states somewhere, is 
situated in ether, where it can be heard by the ear and grasped by the mind (Mahå-bh I p. 18 
l. 19-20, on ÍivasËtra 1 vt. 12: ßrotropalabdhir buddhinirgråhya˙ prayogeˆåbhijvalita 
åkåßadeßa˙ ßabda[˙]). 
 I have dwelt a bit on Patañjali's ideas about words and sounds (without being 
exhaustive), since these ideas are remarkably similar to ideas developed in Sarvåstivåda 
Buddhism. The classical enumerations of dharmas of the Sarvåstivådins contain, as is well 
known, the following three linguistic dharmas: nåmakåya, padakåya and vyañjanakåya. 
These dharmas already occur in the lists of cittaviprayukta saµskåras found in several 
canonical Abhidharma texts of this school, viz., the Dharmaskandha, the Prakaraˆapåda and 
the Jñånaprasthåna, as well as in the so-called Pañcavastuka. 
 This is not the place to discuss the original meaning of these three terms in detail. It 
may be significant that the earliest translation of the Pañcavastuka into Chinese knows only 
two linguistic dharmas; perhaps there were only two of them in the beginning. However 
that may be, it seems clear that these linguistic dharmas covered, right from the beginning, 
words and sounds. Words and sounds, being dharmas, were conceived of as being 
independent entities: the word being different from its “constituting” sounds, and each 
sound being different from the noise that manifests it. 
 The introduction of linguistic dharmas by the Sarvåstivådins fits in well with their 
ontological concerns. Their lists of dharmas were thought of as lists of all there is. The 
Sarvåstivådins were deeply concerned to determine what does and what does not exist. 
Chariots, houses, and everything that is composite does not really exist, they claimed. Only 
the  ultimate constitutents of those objects, that is to say the dharmas, do really exist. By 
including words and sounds into their lists of dharmas they gave expression to the view that 
these linguistic entities are independent entities that have no constitutent parts, and are no 
sequences of sounds or anything else. Reflections like these fit naturally in their 
philosophical concerns. 
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 Contrary to the Sarvåstivådins, Patañjali the grammarian had no such ontological 
concerns. Ontology plays no role whatsoever in his Mahåbhå∑ya. And yet we find there, 
somewhat hidden away in grammatical discussions, these unnecessary and quaint ideas 
about the ontological status of words and sounds, claiming that words and sounds have a 
separate existence independent from their constituent parts. The question is inevitable: 
where did Patañjali get these ideas from? 
 An easy answer presents itself, of course. Patañjali may have undergone the direct 
or indirect influence of the early Sarvåstivådin thinkers. It may be necessary to recall that 
our evidence regarding the early period of Indian thought is lacunary, and that the nature of 
the texts concerned is such that we cannot expect explicit mention of the sources that 
influenced them. It follows that all conclusions have to be tentative. Keeping all this in 
mind, it seems yet safe to consider Buddhist influence on Patañjali a probable proposition. 
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